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ABSTRACT 
Diminishing Sensitivity for 
Other-Regarding Preferences. (April 2002) 
Sarah Anne Hill 
Department of Mathematics 
Texas A&M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. William S. Neilson 
Department of Economics 
Because of the pervasiveness of diminishing sensitivity in economics, and 
because diminishing sensitivity has played such a crucial role in examining behavior 
toward risk, diminishing sensitivity for other-regarding preferences is explored using 
several proposed models and the equal-division equivalent. By placing restrictions on 
the models suggested by Fehr and Schmidt and by Charness and Rabin, inequity 
aversion and diminishing sensitivity can be guaranteed when the player is ahead and 
behind opponents. There are no simple restrictions that will guarantee diminishing 
sensitivity in the models suggested by Neilson and Stowe and by Bolton and Ockenfels 
when the decision-maker is ahead of his opponents. Thus if diminishing sensitivity is a 
desirable property of a model of other-regarding preferences, the Neilson-Stowe and 
Bolton-Ockenfels models are not appropriate. For both the Fehr-Schmidt and Charness- 
Rabin models, the restrictions for diminishing sensitivity imply a dislike of a Robin 
Hood scheme that redistributes wealth from a higher-payoff opponent to a lower-payoff 
opponent. While one interpretation of this result is that diminishing sensitivity is not 
desirable in the context of other-regarding preferences, the problem actually is with the 
models themselves. Because the models only consider inequity aversion between the 
decision-maker and each individual opponent rather than a type of inequity between 
opponents, these models yield a dislike of redistribution of wealth ffom high-payoff 
players to low-payoff players. Therefore these results suggest that perhaps other 
models should be constructed which allow for diminishing sensitivity and a preference 
for a redistribution of wealth. 
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l. INTRODUCTION 
Diminishing sensitivity is a general assumption stating that the further away an 
object or person is lrom a source or point of reference, the lower the impact of 
additional changes, This assumption has had fundamental implications in many areas. 
In this paper we explore diminishing sensitivity in the context of other-regarding 
preferences, that is, preferences in which the decision-maker cares about his opponents' 
payoffs. There are three good reasons for doing so. First, diminishing sensitivity is 
pervasive in economics, but its implications for other-regarding behavior have not yet 
been explored. Second, diminishing sensitivity would have been an appropriate starting 
point for examining preferences in a different context — behavior toward risk. Third, 
studies by Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) provide some evidence of 
diminishing sensitivity for other-regarding preferences. 
Diminishing sensitivity has found a place in numerous fields. For example, it 
provides the basis for models of discounting that now underlie many theories of finance. 
In economics, it appears in one form as the diminishing marginal rate of substitution. 
This is the phenomena where, as an individual consumes more and more units of one 
good, he is willing to give up fewer and fewer units of another good in order to remain 
at the same utility level. Another example Rom economics concerns the marginal 
product, commordy defined as the additional output produced fiom one additional unit 
This thesis follows the style and format of Econometrica. 
of input, such as labor. Again because of diminishing sensitivity, the marginal product 
is generally considered to be diminishing as the number of units of input increases. 
Diminishing sensitivity is even displayed in physical processes. For instance, the 
intensities of light and gravity decrease at decreasing rates the greater the distance Rom 
their sources. 
While the pervasiveness of diminishing sensitivity suggests that it should at least 
be explored in the new choice context of other-regarding preferences, an analogy with 
the analysis of behavior toward risk suggests that diminishing sensitivity might be the 
appropriate place to start when characterizing preferences. When he first introduced 
what we now know as expected utility theory, Daniel Bernoulli (1738) restricted 
attention to risk aversion. Risk aversion went on to become the dominant paradigm 
within expected utility theory until Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provided compelling 
evidence that while people tend to be risk averse over gains, they also tend to be risk 
seeking over losses, This more complicated pattern is implied by diminishing 
sensitivity to changes in wealth. Perhaps diminishing sensitivity can lead to the "right" 
behavioral assumptions for other-regarding preferences just as it did for preferences 
toward risk. 
The study of other-regarding preferences is a relatively new field in economic 
theory. Until recently, economists constructed models using the assumption that a 
person's utility from a competitive game is a function of the individual's own payoff 
without regard to others' outcomes. However, the data suggest that rather thm being 
entirely selfish, people do care about the payoffs of other players, and so economists are 
now creating models that are a function of a player's utility from his own payoff as well 
as his concern for his opponents' payoffs. Evidence of these social preferences can be 
found in the ultimatum and dictator games. In both games, Player A is asked to thvide 
one dollar between himself and Player B. In the ultimatum game Player B can either 
accept or reject Player A's proposaL If he accepts, the dollar is divided according to 
Player A's proposal, and if he rejects, both players receive a payoff of zero. In the 
dictator game, the dollar is simply divided according to Player A's proposal, and Player 
B has no input. Standard theory predicts that the outcome in the ultimatum game is that 
Player A will take $0, 99 and give $0. 01 to Player B, and Player B accepts this proposal 
because even one penny is preferred to a payoff of zero. However, experimental 
evidence shows that in many cases Player B is willing to reject proposals where the 
offer is relatively small (less than 30 cents), thus indicating a willingness to sacrifice 
some of his own payoff in order to punish an ungenerous Player A (Thaler (1998)). In 
the dictator game, standard theory predicts that Player A will take the entire dollar 
because Player B is unable to reject the proposal. However, Player A often gives at 
least a small portion of the dollar to Player B (around 20 cents), which indicates that 
Player A has some inherent sense of fairness in dividing the dollar. The results fiom 
these two games suggest that people do in fact receive some utility Irom the payoffs that 
go to other players. Additionally, research in the area of psychology by Loewenstein, 
Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) provides some evidence of diminishing sensitivity for 
other-regarding preferences. 
Several models of other-regarding preferences have been proposed, and they 
differ in how they treat the payoffs of the other players. One model, by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), describes the player' s utility as a function of his own earnings and the 
difference of his opponent's payoff and his own payoff. That is, the model is concerned 
with how much more (or less) the opponent is earning. In another model by Charness 
and Rabin (2002), the player's utility is a weighted sum of his own payoff and the other 
player's earnings. This weight depends upon whether he is doing better or worse than 
the other player. A model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) describes the player's utility 
as a function of his own payoff as well as his share of the total earnings, This model 
considers the proportion of the player's earnings relative to the total earnings of all 
players. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore diminishing sensitivity using the above 
models of other-regarding preferences. We determine what restrictions are necessary in 
order to guarantee inequity aversion (or a preference for equality in payoffs) and 
diminishing sensitivity in these models. To do so, we use the equal-division equivalent, 
or EDE, introduced by Neilson and Stowe (2001). While all of the models are able to 
show inequity aversion, if diminishing sensitivity is a desirable property, then we are 
able to specify which models can and cannot exhibit this attribute. After identifying 
reactions that imply diminishing sensitivity within the different models discussed 
above, we go on to examine whether they are desirable reactions. In particular, we 
explore whether preferences that satisfy the restrictions exhibit a liking for Robin Hood 
schemes that redistribute wealth lrom a higher-payoff opponent to a lower-payoff 
opponent. We find that the restrictions needed in order for the models to exhibit 
diminishing sensitivity also create an aversion for this redistribution of wealth, 
indicating that diminishing sensitivity may not be a desirable property of models of 
other-regarding preferences, or, perhaps, that the models themselves may not be 
adequate. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the models and definitions 
needed for the theorems in section 3. Section 3 presents the three main theorems as 
well as a corollary. Section 4 explores an alternative interpretation of diminishing 
sensitivity through the Robin Hood scheme. Section 5 offers a conclusion. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
Suppose there is a decision-maker with n partners/opponents. An allocation is a 
vector (xp, . . . ~„) c R, "+', with xp & 0 the payoff to the decision-maker and xl & 0 the 
payoff to opponent i, for i = l, . . . , n. The decision-maker has preferences over 
allocations that can be represented by a utility function U: R+"" — p R. 
The utility representation U is meant to be quite general Other researchers have 
proposed more specific forms for U, and we wish to leave our construction sufficiently 
general to include all of them as special cases so as to encompass all the specific forms, 
In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that U has the form 
II 
U(x, , . . . , x„) = u(xp)+ pvl(xl — x, ), 
I'=1 
so that utility is separable in the decision-maker's own payoff and the differences 
between his opponents' payoffs and his own payoff. Charness and Rabin (2002) 
propose a function of the form 
U(zp . . z ):Q(xp)+gv, (x, ), 
1=1 
(2) 
so that the utility function is separable in the decision-maker' s own payoff and the 
levels of his opponents' payoffs. Neilson and Stowe (2001) consider a special case of 
this specification in which 
II II 
U(zp ~, . z ) = 1 Pc Ju(x, )++cpu(x, . ). 
i=1 i=1 
In their formulation, the decision-maker uses the same utility function, u, to evaluate 
everyone's payoff, but weights the utilities differently for different individuals. Finally, 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) specify 
U(xp . x ) u(xp)+v 
(Xp + . . . + X„) (4) 
so that utility is separable in the decision-maker' s own payoff and his share of the total 
payoff. This last specification assumes that afi payoffs are nonnegative, and that at least 
one is positive, which is why we restrict attention to aHocations in R, "". 
To make the ideas of inequity aversion and diminishing sensitivity concrete, we 
use the concept of an equal-division equivalent proposed by Neilson and Stowe (2001). 
The equal-division equivalent, or EDE, of the allocation (xp, . . . ~„) is the value h that 
satisfies 
U(xp, . . . ~„) = U(h, . . . , h). 
In other words, the equal-division equivalent is set so that the decision-maker is 
indifferent between the original allocation and everyone receiving the same payoff h. 
Equation (5) defines a function h(xp, . . . ~„). Since U(h, . . . , h ) & U(h, . . . , h) for aH h* & h, 
the behavior of the function h(xp, . ~„) can be used to gauge changes in the decision- 
maker's utility. 
So far, inequity aversion is an ifi-defined term While the basic idea is widely 
accepted, formal definitions tend to be tied to specific functional forms for the utility 
function. Neilson and Stowe (2001) define inequity aversion in terms of the equal- 
division equivalent. We, too, use the equal-division equivalent to formalize inequity 
aversion, although in a somewhat different way from Neilson and Stowe. Their 
definition was based on the idea that the decision-maker is made worse off by inequity, 
and therefore would be willing to sacrifice the group's payoff in order to restore equity. 
In contrast, we base our definition on the idea that the decision-maker dislikes increases 
in inequality. More precisely, we say that as x& moves farther from ~ for some i = 
I, . . . , n, inequality increases, and the decision-maker should dislike the change. 
Consequently, the EDE should falL 
We say that the utility function U exhibits inequity aversion when ahead if 
ah/dx, & 0 for alii = I, . . . , n and allx; &~. Ifx, &xo, the decision-maker is ahead of 
opponent i in the sense that his payoff is higher than i' s. An increase in x; reduces 
inequality by making opponent i's payoff closer to the decision-maker' s, which should 
make the EDE rise. Similarly, we say that U exhibits inequity aversion when behind if 
tlh/tlx; & 0 for all i = I, . . . , n and all x; & xv. When x, & xp, an increase in x; moves 
opponent i farther ahead of the decision-maker, which should make EDE falL The 
utility function exhibits inequity aversion if it exhibits inequity aversion when both 
ahead and behind. Finally, we say that inequity aversion (when ahead or behind) is 
strict if the partial derivative Bh/Bx; is non-zero and has the appropriate sign. 
Diminishing sensitivity suggests that the farther something gets from a reference 
point, the less changes should matter. Here we look at the decision-maker's sensitivity 
to changes in his opponents' payoffs, and we use as a reference point the decision- 
maker's own payoff, This reference point makes sense because if an opponent's payoff 
is at the reference point, his payoff and the decision-maker's are equal, and, at least 
within the two-person subgroup, there is no inequity. Any movement in the opponent's 
payoff away from the reference point increases inequality, which an inequity averse 
decision-maker is dislikes, Diminishing sensitivity suggests that the farther the 
opponent's payoff moves fiom the inequity averse decision-maker's payoff, the less 
additional movements reduce the decision-maker' s utility. 
To formalize this notion, we say that a utility function U that is inequity averse 
when ahead exhibits diminishing sensitivity when ahead if 8 h/dx; & 0 when x; (xo. 
When x, & xD, an increase in x~ moves opponent i's payoff closer to the reference point. 
According to diminishing sensitivity, movements away Rom the reference point should 
be accompanied by smaller changes in utility, which we measure as smaller changes in 
the EDE h. So, as x; moves closer to xo from below, additional increases in x; should 
lead to larger changes in the EDE. Similarly, a utility function that is inequity averse 
when behind exhibits diminishing sensitivity when behind if d h/dx; & 0 when xi & xo. 
When the decision-maker is behind, increases in x, represent movements away fiom the 
reference point. They also represent increases in inequality, and therefore a decline in 
h, As x; moves farther Rom the reference point, the impact of additional movements 
should be reduced, meaning that the corresponding changes in the EDE should be 
smaller, that is, less negative. Consequently, the derivative 8 h/dx& should be positive. 
We say that an inequity averse utility function exhibits diminishing sensitivity if it 
exhibits it when both ahead and behind. Finally, we say that diminishing sensitivity 
(when ahead or betund) is strict when 3 /t/i', ' & 0. 
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3. INEQUITY AVERSION AND DIMINISHING SENSITIVITY 
In this section, we examine four different functional forms for the utility 
function to determine what restrictions, if any, guarantee inequity aversion and 
diminishing sensitivity, The functional forms are chosen to reflect some other- 
regarding utility functions already present in the literature. We first look at a functional 
form consistent with that proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), then at one proposed 
by Charness and Rabin (2002) and a special case examined by Neilson and Stowe 
(2001), and finally a form consistent with that investigated by Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000). 
Throughout this section we resnict attention to the setting in which the decision- 
maker has a single opponent. The results can be easily extended to settings with more 
opponents. In aH cases considered below, the utility function U over two-person 
allocations has the form U(x0~t) = u(x0) + v(t(x0~t)). For allocations among more 
players, one could use the utility function U(x0, . . . &. ) = u(x0) + vt(fl(xa " pm)) + "~ + 
v„(f„(xa, . . . z, )), and the restrictions found on the function v below for the single- 
opponent setting could be applied to each of the n functions vn„. , v„. 
We begin with a functional form consistent with the one proposed by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999). They analyze the utility function U(~zt) = u(xa) + v(x& — xa), so that 
utility depends on the decision-maker' s own payoff and the difference between his 
opponent's payoff and his own payoff. 
Theorem 1. Suppose U(xo, xt) = u(xo) + v(xt — xo) with u' & 0 and u" & 0. Then this 
function exhibits inequity aversion when ahead if v'(z) & 0 when z & 0 and inequity 
aversion when behind if v'(z) & 0 when z & 0. It satisfies diminishing sensitivity if, in 
addition, v" & 0 except at 0. 
Proof. By definition, 
u(h(xo, x, )) = u(x, )+ v(x, xp). 
This implies 
Bh v'(x, — x, ) 
Bx, u'(h(xo, x, )) (7) 
So when z & 0, t)h/t)xt & 0, and when z & 0, t)h/t)xt & 0. Therefore, U(xs, xt) exhibits 
inequity aversion. 
Further differentiation of equation (7) yields 
u (h(xo xt))v'(xi — xo) — v'(xi — xo)u"(h(xa xi)) 
Bx (u (h(xo xi))) 
Since u' & 0, v' . (dh/t)x ) & 0, and u" & 0, if v" & 0, then 8'h/t)xt & 0. Thus U(xp, x ) 
exhibits diminishing sensitivity. 
~ 
For Theorem I, the assumptions of u' & 0 and u" & 0 follow the standard theory 
so that as the decision-maker's payoff increases, his utility increases at a decreasing rate 
(that is, the decision-maker shows diminishing sensitivity for his own payoffs). When 
xt & xIt, the decision-maker is ahead, so an increase in the opponent's payoff means that 
the thfference in the payoffs (xi - xs) has decreased and is now closer to zero. Thus the 
decision-maker's utility increases as a result of the equalization in payoffs, and v' (z) & 
12 
0. On the other hand, when x, & xo, the decision-maker is behind, so an increase in the 
opponent's payoff means that the difference in the payoffs (xt - xo) has increased and 
has moved further away Rom zero. Thus the decision-maker's utility decreases as a 
result of greater inequity in the payoffs, and v' (z) & 0. 
Additionally, v" (z) & 0 means that as xt moves away Rom xo, the decision- 
maker exhibits diminishing sensitivity with respect to the difference in the payoffs. 
This can be shown by graphing v(z) against z = xt — xo (see Figure 1). When z & 0, as 
the difference in the payoffs increases, the decision-maker's utility decreases at a 
decreasing rate, giving v" (z) & 0. When z & 0, as the difference in payoffs increases, 
the decision-maker' s utility decreases at a decreasing rate, again giving v" (z) & 0. 
Thus v" (z) & 0 for all z except at 0. 
v(z) 
FIGURE I. -Fehr-Schmidt unlity function. 
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We now turn attention to a second functional form for the other-regarding utility 
function, the form proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002). Where Fehr and Schmidt 
assumed that the opponent's payoff enters the decision-maker's utility function only as 
the difference between the two payoffs, Charness and Rabin assume that the level of the 
opponent's payoff matters, so that U(xp~j) = u(xp) + v(xt). 
Theorem 2. Suppose U(xp~t) = u(xp) + v(x, ) with u' & 0, u" & 0, and u'(x) & Iv'(x)l for 
allx, Then this function exhibits inequity aversion when ahead if v'(xt) & 0 for xt &xp, 
and exhibits inequity aversion when behind if v'(xt) & 0 for xt & xp. It satisfies 
diminishing sensitivity if, in addition, 0 & v"(x) & -u"(x) for all x except at 0. 
Proof. By definition, 
u(h(x„x, ))+ v(h(xp xf)) = u(x, )+v(x, ), 
This implies 
p)h v'(x, ) 
Bx, u'(h(xp, x, )) + v'(h(xp, g )) (10) 
So when xt & xp, 8/t/Q)xt & 0, and when xt & xp, dh/Q)xt & 0. Therefore, U(xp, xt) exhibits 
inequity aversion. 
Further differentiation of equation (10) yields 
3'h 1 
[(u (A(xp xt )) + v (A(xp xg )))v (z~ ) 
QIX, 
' (u'(h(x„x, )) + v'(h(x„x, )))' 
QIh, QIh ) 
— v'(x, )[u'(h(x„x, )) + v'(h(xp, x, )) 
J 
. 
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Because u' & 0 and u' & 
~ 
v' 
~, if v" & 0, then [u'(h(xp~l)) + v'(h(xp&l))]v"(xl) & 0, The 
only part of equation (11) left to examine is 
v'(x, ) u'(h(Zp Xl)) +v (/l(Xp Zl)) J. 
l)h . dh I a„' a, j 
Because t)h/t)xt = v'(xl)/(u'(h) + v'(h)), the above term can be written as 
v'(x, )'(u'(/l(x„x, ))+ v (h(xp, x, ))) 
u (h(xp, x, )) + v (h(x, xl )) 
Since u' & 0, u' & 
~ 
v' [, u" & 0, and -u" & v", the above term is then non-positive and 
t) h/Bxl' & 0, Thus U(xp, xl) exhibits diminishing sensitivity. 
~ 
For Theorem 2, when xl & xp, the decision-maker is ahead, so an increase in the 
opponent's payoff means that the difference in the payoffs has decreased. Thus the 
decision-maker's utility increases as a result of the equalization in payoffs, and v' & 0. 
On the other hand, when xl & xp, the decision-maker is behind, so an increase in the 
opponent's payoff means that the difference in the payoffs has increased. Thus the 
decision-maker's utility decreases as a result of greater inequity in the payoffs, and v' & 
0. The requirements that u' & 
~ 
v' 
I and -u" & v" make sense in this context because 
an individual normally gives more weight to his own payoff than his opponent's payoff, 
Additionally there is the condition that v" & 0, which while possible, is rather 
restrictive. In order for all of the above restrictions to be nue, when v' & 0 this means 
that the functions u and v must be asymptotic to parallel lines (see Figure 2), or the 
15 
domain must be bounded, In the case where v' & 0, v is below u and either asymptotic 
to a line with a negative slope (see Figure 2), or the domain must be bounded. 
u(x), v(x) 
u(x) 
v(x) & 0 
v(x) & 0 
FIGURE 2. -Cbatness-Rabin utility function. 
With this model it is important to note the resnictions created by the 
assumptions for inequity aversion and diminishing sensitivity. For the function v, it is 
necessary to assume that that v' & 0 when xt & Je and v' & 0 when xt & xp. Thus while v 
16 
is a function of xi, it is also implicitly a function of xi', This result suggests that to 
accommodate inequity aversion, v should be explicitly written as a function of xs and xi. 
Furthermore, the conditions that -u" & v" and v" & 0 greatly restrict both u and 
v. To guarantee that v" & 0, it must be true that u' (xs) & v' (xi) for all xo and xi. While 
this is possible, as shown by Figure 2, these limitations may not be desirable for a 
model of other-regarding preferences. 
Neilson and Stowe (2001) use an axiomatic approach to construct a model that 
can be considered a special case of the Charness-Rabin model. Their axioms imply the 
existence of a utility function with the form U(xo~i) = (I-c)u(xi') + cu(xi), which can be 
seen to be a special case of Charness and Rabin's formulation when v(xi) = cu(xi)/(l-c). 
Consequently, the restrictions needed on the Neilson-Stowe utility function can be 
found by applying Theorem 2. 
Corollary. Suppose U(xo~i) = (I-c)u(xi') + cu(xi) with u' & 0 and u" & 0. Then this 
function exhibits inequity aversion when ahead if 0 & c & Vi, and exhibits inequity 
aversion when behind if c & 0. It satisfies diminishing sensitivity if c & 0. 
Proof. The function )rom Theorem 2 can be written as U(xii, xi) = W(xo) + V(xi) 
in order to differentiate between that form and this special case. Theorem 2 then 
implies that W = (1 — c)u and V = cu = [c/(1-c)] W. This implies W' = (1 - c)u' and V = 
[c/(1-c)] W'. Also, W" = (1 — c)u" and Y ' = [c/(1-c)] W". Theorem 2 requires that 
u'(x) & Iv'(x)l for all x, which holds if c & Vi. If u' & 0 and u" & 0, then according to 
17 
Theorem 2, U exhibits inequity aversion when ahead if V & 0, which requires 0 & c & 
Yi, and U exhibits inequity aversion when behind if V & 0, which requires c & 0. 
Similarly, according to Theorem 2, U exhibits diminishing sensitivity when 0 & 
V' & -W", which occurs when c & 0. 
~ 
There are several points to note with the Corollary to Theorem 2, First, the 
results for inequity aversion show that when the decision-maker is ahead, the constant c 
is positive (although less than Y~l, and when the decision-maker is behind, c is negative. 
These assumptions seem appropriate in the context of this model, although they require 
that c depend on xs and xu When the decision-maker is ahead, 0 & c & Yi, so the 
decision-maker's utility increases as a result of gains in his own payoff as well as his 
opponent's, but he gives greater weight to his own payoff. When the decision-maker is 
behind, c & 0, so his utility increases as a result of gains in his own payoff and decreases 
as a result of gains in his opponent's payoff. 
The primary problem with the functional form is that it cannot exhibit 
diminishing sensitivity when c is positive. Since c & 0 is the condition for inequity 
aversion when ahead, the decision-maker cannot exhibit both inequity aversion and 
diminishing sensitivity when ahead. Consequently, if one views diminishing sensitivity 
when ahead as a valid requirement of the other-regarding utility function, the Neilson- 
Stowe model fails. 
18 
The final functional form to be considered here is the one proposed by Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000). In their formulation, utility depends on the level of the decision- 
maker's payoff and his share of the total, so that V(xo&&) = u(xo) + v(xo/(xs+ xi)). 
Theorem3. SupposeU(x„x, )=u(x, )+v ' withu' &0, u" &0. Thenthis 
I xv+xi) 
model exhibits inequity aversion when ahead if v' (z) & 0 for z & Vi and inequity 
aversion when behind if v' (z) & 0 for z & i/2. It satisfies diminishing sensitivity when 
behind, if, in addition, v" (z) & 0 except at V~. 
Proof. By definition, 
(Il ( x, 
u(h(x„x, ))+vL — ) = u(x, )+v $2 x~+x, ) (12) 
This implies 
ax, u'(h(x„x, )) (13) 
So when xi & xo, t)hQxt & 0, and when xi & xo, t)hlrixt & 0. Therefore, U(x0, xi) exhibits 
inequity aversion. 
Further differentiation of equation (13) yields 
d'h 1 
Bxl (u (/i(xo xg))) [(xo +xy) I xp +xy ) (za +xI) (xp +x~ 
ah1 
i~(. . ", ) ~. . ", I ' ~, J 
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Since u' & 0, u" & 0, and v' & 0 and dh/Bxt & 0 when xt & ~, if v" & 0, then 8 h/dxt & 
0. Thus+~, xt) exhibits diminishing sensitivity when behind. ~ 
Note that in Theorem 3 a function which exhibits inequity aversion may not 
exhibit diminishing sensitivity when xt & xp. For example, if v" & 0 in equation (14), 
then it is possible to have 
(xo+x ) xo+xt (xo+xi) xo+ 
givmg a'h/Bx &0. Similarly, if v" &0, it maybe that a'h/ax, '&0. 
For Theorem 3, when xt & ~, the decision-maker is ahead, so an increase in the 
opponent's payoffs means that the difference in the payoffs has decreased. Thus the 
decision-maker's utility increases as a result of this equalization in payoffs, however, 
the decision-maker's share of the payoffs has actually decreased, therefore v' & 0. On 
the other hand, when x, & xs, the decision-maker is behind, so an increase in the 
opponent's payoff means that the difference in the payoffs has increased, Thus the 
decision-maker's utility decreases as a result of greater inequity in the payoffs, and 
since the decision-maker's share of payoffs has also decreased, v' & 0. 
Additionally, v" & 0 means that as xt moves away fiom xs, the decision-maker 
exhibits diminishing sensitivity with respect to his share of payoffs. This can be shown 
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by graphing v against the decision-maker's share of payoffs (see Figure 3). When the 
share of payoffs is less than Vt, the decision-maker is behind, and so as the inequity in 
payoffs increases and the share of payoffs becomes smaller, the decision-maker' s utility 
will decrease at a decreasing rate. Thus v" & 0 when the decision-maker is behind (xt & 
v(xgx0+x, )) 
0. 0 
XQX0+X, ) 
1. 0 
FIGURE 3. -Bolton-Octcenfels utility function. 
Table I summarizes the results of the three theorems. All three models are able 
to accommodate inequity aversion, although the Charness-Rabin model requires that the 
function v depend on both zt and xo. Also, all three models are able to handle 
diminishing sensitivity when behind. They differ in their ability to accommodate 
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diminishing sensitivity when ahead; in particular, the Bolton-Ockenfels model and the 
Neilson-Stowe model are unable to guarantee diminishing sensitivity when ahead. 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Fehr — Schmidt Charness — Rabin Bolton — Ockenfels 
Inequity 
Aversion when 
Ahead 
Inequity 
Aversion 
when Behind 
Diminishing 
Sensitivity 
when Ahead 
Diminishing 
Sensitivity 
when Behind 
u(xo) + v(xt — xo) 
v'& 0 
v'&0 
v" &0 
v"&0 
u(xo) + v(xt) 
v'&0 
v'&0 
v" &0 
v" & 0 
Q(xs) + v(xp/(xo+ xt)) 
v'& 0 
v'&0 
v" &0 
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4. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
OF DIMINISHING SENSITIVITY 
In the preceding section, we quantified diminishing sensitivity in terms of its 
implications for changes in the EDE in a setting with one opponent. There are, of 
course, other ways to think about diminishing sensitivity. A natural one is to think 
about how the decision-maker compares two different opponents, one of whose payoffs 
is farther &om the decision-maker's than the other' s. Intuition tells us that the decision- 
maker would be made strictly better off by taking money away 1'rom the richer of the 
two opponents and giving it to the poorer. As we show in this section, these intuitively 
plausible preferences are not always consistent with diminishing sensitivity, 
Consider the following scenario. The decision-maker has two opponents, and 
his preferences are represented by the function U(xo~iz&). Assume, without loss of 
generality, that xi ) xi. We are interested in the following question: Would the 
decision-maker prefer to take a (marginal) amount of money away I'rom opponent 2 and 
give it to opponent 1? 
Begin with the Fehr-Schmidt specification (rom Theorem 1, where the decision- 
maker's utility function is U(xo, xi~i) = u(xo) + v(xi — xo) + v(xs — xo). Consider a Robin 
Hood scheme in which the allocation changes so that player 1's payoff is increased by 
the marginal amount dx and player 2's is decreased by the same amount. The decision- 
maker's utility then changes by 
dU = v'(xi — xo)dx — v'(xq — xo)dx. 
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By Theorem 1, diminishing sensitivity holds if v" & 0 except at zero, which in turn 
implies that dU & 0 under the Robin Hood scheme as long as the decision-maker is 
either ahead or behind both opponents. If xt & xs & xt, and if the Theorem 1 
requirements for inequity aversion hold, dU & 0, Still, though, in the Fehr-Schmidt 
setting, diminishing sensitivity and a preference for reallocating Irom rich to poor are 
incompatible. 
The Charness-Rabin specification I'rom Theorem 2 is similar, Here the decision- 
maker's utility function is U(xs~t xs) = u(xu) + v(xt) + v(xt). Using the Robin Hood 
scheme again, the decision-maker's utility changes by 
rfU = v (xt)rjx — v (z2)rfx. 
By Theorem 2, diminishing sensitivity holds if v" & 0 except at zero, and so dU & 0 
when the decision-maker is ahead or behind both opponents. If xt & xs & xs, and if the 
Theorem 2 requirements for inequity aversion hold, dU & 0. Thus in the Charness- 
Rabin model diminishing sensitivity and a preference for reallocating from rich to poor 
are again incompatible. 
An inspection of the Bolton-Ockenfeis specification gives a different result. 
Here the player only looks at his share of the total payoffs, and so he is indifferent as to 
how the marginal amount dx is allocated between player 1 and player 2 in the Robin 
Hood scheme. As long as xu and the total payoff to all of the players do not change, 
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then the decision-maker's utility does not change. So in the Bolton-Ockenfels model, 
diminishing sensitivity indicates an indifference for the Robin Hood scheme. 
It is worthwhile to note here why diminishing sensitivity and reallocating Iiom 
rich to poor are incompatible in the Fehr-Schmidt and Charness-Rabin specifications. 
The changes in utility due to the Robin Hood scheme are a result of inequity aversion, 
and the degrees of the changes in utility are a result of diminishing sensitivity. 
Consider, for example, the case where x0 & xi &xi. When player 1's payoff 
increases by dx and player 2's payoff decreases by dx, then the inequity between the 
decision-maker and player 1 increases while the inequity between the decision-maker 
and player 2 decreases. Because of diminishing sensitivity, however, the overall utility 
decreases because the player is more sensitive to the change in player 1's payoff. Since 
the decision-maker's utility is not directly a function of the difference in the payoffs of 
players 1 and 2, then any change in utility iiom the decrease in inequity between the 
payoffs of players 1 and 2 is not accounted for by these two models. The results are 
similar whenxi &xi &x0. 
Finally there is the case where xi & x0 & x&. In this instance when player 1's 
payoff increases by dx and player 2's payoff decreases by dx, then the inequity between 
the decision-maker and player 1 decreases and the inequity between the decision-maker 
and player 2 also decreases. Because there is less inequity between the decision- 
maker's payoff and the payoffs to player 1 as well as player 2, the decision-maker's 
utility increases. Again, however, this change in utility is not the result of a decrease in 
inequity of the payoffs of players 1 and 2. 
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While the Fehr-Schmidt and Charness-Rabin specifications seem to have the 
property that diminishing sensitivity and the Robin Hood scheme are incompatible, this 
may actually be due to the construction of the models themselves. Both specitications 
base the decision-maker's utility function upon inequity aversion only with opponents, 
and neither considers a direct type of inequity aversion based upon differences in the 
opponents' payo ffs. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Because of the pervasiveness of diminishing sensitivity in economics, and 
because diminishing sensitivity has played such a crucial role in examining behavior 
toward risk, we have explored diminishing sensitivity for other-regarding preferences 
using several proposed models and the EDE. We found that by placing restrictions on 
the models suggested by Fehr and Schmidt and by Chamess and Rabin, we can 
guarantee inequity aversion and diminishing sensitivity when the player is ahead and 
behind. On the other hand, the Neilson-Stowe model does not exhibit diminishing 
sensitivity when the player is ahead, and there are no simple restrictions that will 
guarantee diminishing sensitivity in the Bolton-Ockenfels model when the player is 
ahead. Thus if diminishing sensitivity is a desirable property of a model of other- 
regarding preferences, the Neilson-Stowe and Bolton-Ockenfels models are not 
appropriate. 
ln order to determine whether diminishing sensitivity is desirable in these 
models, we looked at a Robin Hood scheme that redistributes wealth f'rom a higher- 
payoff opponent to a lower-payoff opponent. For both the Fehr-Schmidt and Charness- 
Rabin models, the resnictions for diminishing sensitivity imply a dislike of this Robin 
Hood scheme. While one interpretation of this result is that diminishing sensitivity is 
not desirable in the context of other-regarding preferences, the problem actually is with 
the models themselves. Because the models only consider inequity aversion between 
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the player and each individual opponent rather than a type of inequity aversion for the 
payoffs to all players, these models yield a dislike of the Robin Hood scheme. 
Therefore, these results suggest that perhaps another model should be 
constructed which allows for diminishing sensitivity and a preference for a 
redistribution of wealth. One such model is as follows. Define xz —  min(x; I x; & x0) 
and xtr = max (x; I x, & x0). Then let U(x0, . . . ~„) = u(xs) + vz(xz - xs) + vu(xn - xo). Notice 
that if the player has only one opponent, then this model is the same as the Fehr- 
Schmidt model for which we have already characterized inequity aversion and 
diminishing sensitivity. Also, here the player will have a preference for some Robin 
Hood schemes because the player's utility will increase as the wealth of the lowest- 
payoff opponent increases, and similarly the player's utility will increase as the wealth 
of the highest-payoff opponent decreases. It is likely that there are many other models 
that could also capture diminishing sensitivity for other-regarding preferences and a 
preference for the redistribution of wealth. 
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